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In Search of Theory: Towards an Integrating Conceptual Framework for Subsidiary 
Research 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the importance of the strategic choices taken by subsidiary managers to the long 
terms survival of their unit, little is known about the phenomenon. (Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 
2009, Scott, Gibbons, & Coughlan, 2010). This paper analyses and synthesises the research 
streams on subsidiary management to date to provide critical conceptual insights and proposes 
a new theoretical approach to subsidiary analysis, applied to the critical routine of subsidiary 
strategy.  
 
The adoption of more global business structures by MNEs has led to additional strategic 
constraints on subsidiary managers (Buckley, 2009, Buckley & Ghauri, 2004, Mudambi, 
2008), which we categorise as the dual embeddedness constraint, the domain constraint and 
the resource constraint. Paradoxically despite these exacerbating constraints, expectations on 
subsidiary managers to create knowledge and innovation and develop their mandate are 
escalating, forcing them to evaluate the range of strategic decisions remaining under their 
control,  
 
While the literature implicitly assumes that subsidiary managers can respond to MNC 
pressures by reconfiguring resources and developing capabilities (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998), 
improving performance (Subramaniam & Watson, 2006) and influencing the strategic 
direction of the MNE as a whole (Andersson, Bjorkman, & Forsgren, 2005, Williams, 2009), 
there is an absence of guidance on how subsidiary managers develop strategies to achieve 
these options, and influence strategy from below (Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2007). Our 
review of the empirical and theoretical research on subsidiary management identifies  how the 
tensions between the headquarters perspective and the subsidiary perspective have resulted in 
the application of inappropriate conceptual frameworks. Platforming from the four primary 
theoretical approaches applied to date, and combining critical tenets of both the resourced 
based and transaction cost approaches, we develop a conceptual framework which overcomes 
prior theoretical limitations and offers a new perspective of subsidiary to apply to the 
subsidiary unit of analysis. 
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In Search of Theory: Towards an Integrating Conceptual Framework for Subsidiary 
Research 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The MNE/subsidiary literature to date has examined the respective roles and relationships 
between headquarters and subsidiaries, and determinants of their respective contributions to 
organisation. The initial objective of theory was to minimise agency risk through maximising 
headquarters control of subsidiary activities (Roth and O’Donnell, Doz and Prahalad), which 
evolved to perceiving the MNE as a federative structure, which achieves competitive 
advantage through harnessing the knowledge and initiative generation of its dispersed 
subsidiaries (Andersson et al, 2007). More recently, the emerging perspective of the MNE as 
a ‘global factory’ suggests that strands of separate activities are distributed to subsidiaries by 
a remote, controlling headquarters (Buckley, 2009).  
 
The sharp contrast between the federative approach to understanding subsidiary behaviour 
and the ‘global factory’ view has critical implications for deriving normative theory and 
practitioner guidance from subsidiary research. In response to this theoretical and 
management imperative, we examine how critical strategic management perspectives have 
been applied to understanding the evolution of subsidiary role. By analysing the theoretical 
lens adopted to date in exploring the determinants of subsidiary role and contribution to the 
MNE, we identify and build a conceptual framework which overcomes prior theoretical 
limitations and offers a new perspective of subsidiary to apply to the subsidiary unit of 
analysis. 
 
The primary contribution of this paper is the development of a conceptual framework which 
combines the critical tenets of the two dominant theories of the firm to the subsidiary unit of 
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analysis. This framework integrates some critical elements in the subsidiary’s context which 
should assist in achieving normative implications from future empirical investigations, and 
enhance the relevance and value of future research to management needs in a time of 
exacerbating expectations and an increasing competitive environment.  
 
The approach taken by this paper is to first demonstrate how subsidiary research to date has 
largely evolved in response to business reality, largely with the absence of supporting 
theoretical frameworks. The next section considers the appropriateness of the available 
theories and the need to uncover the complexities of subsidiary strategy development to 
achieve the critical insights for a conceptual foundation. The final section integrates the 
insights from exploring subsidiary strategy development with the key tenets of the RBV to 
develop a conceptual framework which overcomes prior theoretical limitations and offers a 
new perspective of subsidiary analysis. 
 
Conceptual Background 
The evolution of research on subsidiary operations of MNEs mirrors the evolution of strategic 
management as a distinct discipline, as a classical Strategy Structure Approach, was initially 
adopted. Efforts focused on understanding why certain organisational structures were selected 
(Daniels, Pitts, & Tretter, 1984, Egelhoff, 1982, Stopford, 1972) and then on finding more 
flexible approaches to the traditional hierarchy. It was assumed that structure adapts to fit 
strategy, as captured by Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1989) “transnational solution” to the design 
of MNEs, according scant consideration to the role of the subsidiary.  
 
Agency concerns and the need to balance autonomy (Patterson & Brock, 2002) throughout the 
MNE with control (Gates & Egelhoff, 1986, Hedlund, 1981), led to a focus on headquarters-
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subsidiary relationships. Increasing recognition of the need for subsidiary support to 
implement headquarters’ programmes introduced the concept of subsidiary level decision 
making (Hulbert, Brandt, & Richers, 1980). While some acknowledgement of the need for co-
operation across the MNE emerged (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986, Ghoshal & Nohria, 1989), the 
‘United Nations Syndrome’ (Bartlett and Ghoshal, (1986) in which headquarters treated all 
subsidiaries alike remained dominant. 
 
Recognition of more complex relationships between headquarters and their subsidiary units 
led to the MNE process perspective (Birkinshaw & Pedersen, 2009). Subsidiary autonomy, 
access to key MNE resources, and the influence of management systems or culture on 
subsidiary behaviour were increasingly recognised (Bartlett, 1979, Doz, 1976, Hedlund, 1986, 
Prahalad & Doz, 1981, Prahalad, 1976). Headquarters remained the primary unit of analysis 
however, until Ghoshal’s (1986) study of subsidiary innovation processes inspired exploration 
of how subsidiary autonomy and access to critical resources led to differentiating subsidiary 
roles within the MNE (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986). Subsidiary roles were then classified by 
their integration-responsiveness (IR) within the MNE (Jarillo & Martinez, 1990, Prahalad & 
Doz, 1987), their strategic positioning and strategy (Taggart, 1997b, 1998d, 1998a). Adopting 
the subsidiary as the unit of analysis and, to some extent, taking the headquarters as an 
external factor, allowed for a more detailed examination of subsidiary strategic roles 
(Patterson & Brock, 2002). Building on the initial analysis of Birkinshaw and Pedersen 
(2009), Figure 1 demonstrates the increasing prominence of the subsidiary in theory 
development, and the emergence of literature focusing explicitly on aspects of subsidiary role 
within the MNE.  
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Resolving the Dual Conflicts 
Greater recognition of subsidiary role led to a deeper consideration of the complex reality of 
subsidiary context, as units operate within an internal network of headquarters and subsidiary 
relationships and in multifaceted external environments. The challenge for both the MNE and 
the subsidiary is to exploit these positions for the benefit of the organisation overall, but they 
must operate within two sometimes contrasting and competing positions. The objective of the 
MNE is to exploit its subsidiary network to achieve sustained competitive advantage. This 
may conflict with the often dual objectives of subsidiary management, to contribute to their 
parent organisation and to ensure the survival of their unit. These complexities are reflected in 
the intertwining nature of the literature exploring the evolution of subsidiary role. 
 
Research moved from exploring subsidiary differentiation based on unit responsibilities, 
served markets, network position, competencies and resources, to investigating the roles of 
centres of excellence (CoE), or subsidiaries with specialist functional activities (Fratocchi & 
Holm, 1998, Frost, Birkinshaw, & Ensign, 2002, Holm & Pedersen, 2000, Surlemont, 1998). 
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This provided critical insights into how subsidiaries could protect their position by exploiting 
their unique capabilities, resources and/or network integration within their MNE (Anderson & 
Forsgren, 2000, Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986), although there is still uncertainty as to how CoEs 
arise (Patterson & Brock, 2002). They are however perceived largely as a headquarters led 
strategy, whether formally determined or gradually emergent, as it would be difficult for an 
individual subsidiary to build sufficient specialised resources and talent within its unit, 
without headquarters support (Birkinshaw & Pedersen, 2009). This recognition of specialised 
subsidiary roles also led to exploration of factors leading to the development of regional 
(Lehrer & Asakawa, 1999, Schutte, 1998) and divisional headquarters (Forsgren, Holm, & 
Johanson, 1995), and of subsidiary R&D (Asakawa, 2001, Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005, 
Kummerle, 1997, Noble & Birkinshaw, 1998).  
 
Traditionally headquarters was perceived as the driver of foreign direct investment (Chang, 
1996, Chang, 1995, Kogut, 1983), and with few exceptions the subsidiary input to initiating 
and contributing to the evolution of subsidiary role was overlooked (Crookell, 1987; Jarillo 
and Martinez (1990) and Papanastassiou and Pearce (1994). Studies then explored subsidiary 
development as a series of stages towards building integration and importance within the 
MNE (Birkinshaw & Fey, 2000, Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998, Chang & Rosenzweig, 1998, 
Crookell, 1987, Delany, 1998). A new emphasis emerged focusing on the interaction between 
the MNE, the subsidiary unit and the local environment (Birkinshaw and Hood; 1998: 
Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005). The importance of generating subsidiary initiatives, 
developing competence creating mandates (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005) and engaging in 
micro politics (Dorrenbacher and Gammelgaard (2006) accords an accompanying recognition 
of the role of pro-active subsidiary management in determining subsidiary role.  
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The researcher’s perspective plays a crucial role in the selection and emphasis of the 
perspective on subsidiary evolution adopted (Patterson & Brock, 2002). Brock (2000) 
identifies how researchers from larger countries tend to espouse a corporate point of view, 
and assume that parent company managers are the predominant drivers of subsidiary 
evolution (Chang, 1995, Malnight, 1996). In contrast, research originating from smaller 
countries tends to adopt a subsidiary perspective and emphasise subsidiary initiative 
(Birkinshaw, 1997). 
 
Initial consideration of the determinants and impact of patterns of information flow between 
subsidiaries and HQ led to recognition of the value of Subsidiary Knowledge Networks. 
Firstly it was the internal network that was the focus of attention. Gupta and Govindarajan 
(1991, 2000, 1994) set about explaining the patterns of information flow between subsidiaries 
and their HQ and Szulanski (1996) has contributed to the transfer of ‘best practices’ between 
subsidiaires within the MNE. In terms of the subsidiary’s external network research has 
focused on the strength of linkages between the subsidiary and its local environment. 
 
Research to date suggests that a subsidiary’s access to an external network will only enhance 
its internal network position if it provides superior knowledge of significant importance to 
other MNE units (Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2007). Any shift towards a global factory 
style operation would reduce subsidiary potential for external embeddedness (Buckley & 
Ghauri, 2004, Mudambi, 2008, Yamin & Forsgren, 2006), emphasising the value of 
subsidiary internal ‘embeddedness’ within the MNE network as a strategic option for position 
protection (Garcia-Pont, Canales, & Noboa, 2009). 
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The complexities of subsidiary position are further reflected in recent approaches to 
examining Headquarters Subsidiary Relationships which consider how procedural justice can 
apply to the headquarters / subsidiary planning process (Kim, 1993a, 1993b, Kim & 
Mauborgne, 1991, Taggart, 1997a), the significance of perception gaps between HQ and 
subsidiary managers, and the related consequences. (Birkinshaw, Holm, Thilenius, & 
Arvidsson, 2000, Holm, Johanson, & Thilenius, 1995, Luo, 2003). The impact of micro 
issues, such as political negotiations between subsidiary managers and their headquarters, in 
shaping the internal MNE dynamics is also increasingly acknowledged (Dörrenbächer & 
Gammelgaard, 2006, 2009, Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2006). The four approaches, which 
illustrated in Figure 2 as mutually exclusive for ease of discussion, are in reality, interlinked.  
 
Subsidiary Role: 
Sub Streams
Specialised Roles
Subsidiary Evolution Knowledge 
Networks
HQ Relationship
Adapted from Paterson and Brock (2002) & Birkinshaw and Pedersen (2009)
 
Lack of an Integrative Framework 
The pre-ceding analysis of the subsidiary literature demonstrates that different dimensions of 
MNC /subsidiary relationships and characteristics have been studied without the application 
of a strong integrative conceptual framework and that the work lacks coherency of a 
discipline. The work to date has followed the evolution of the unit of analysis based on 
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observance of practitioner behaviour but has failed to develop a cogent approach. Borrowing 
from the firm level theory to the subsidiary unit, simply adds another level of complexity in 
addition to, as bemoaned by Birkinshaw and Pedersen (2009), the eclectic and 
incommensurable nature of most MNE theories. But before we can build on the approaches 
taken to date we must consider their value. 
 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) while not specifically developed for the MNE context is 
the most broadly used theory in analysing the MNE. It seeks to rationalise MNE existence in 
terms of ownership specific advantages against incumbent domestic competitors, location 
specific advantages that favour investment in the local economy , and the intermediate market 
failure that favours ‘internalisation’ over other forms of contractual arrangements (Buckley & 
Casson, 1976, Dunning, 1980, Rugman, 1981). Despite it proliferation in the literature, there 
are a number of international management scholars (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989, Birkinshaw, 
2000, Doz & Prahalad, 1991, Ghoshal & Moran, 1996, Hedlund, 1994) who criticise its 
ability to provide an in depth understanding of the actual functioning of complex 
organisations such as MNEs.  
 
Similarly, network theory can be criticised for failing to offer an appropriate theoretical lens. 
The MNE is now predominantly conceptualised as a network (Forsgren, 1992, Ghoshal & 
Bartlett, 1990), extending the original application of social exchange theory and resource 
dependency (Emerson, 1962). This approach perceives the subsidiary, not as a subordinate 
entity within the MNE, but as a node in a network, with links to external and internal actors, 
enjoying significant degrees of freedom and influence. While an attractive framework for 
exploring how subsidiaries evolve and exchange information with other actors, its main 
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weakness, is that it is frequently used in a purely descriptive way, which makes it irrefutable, 
detracting from its power as a theory (Birkinshaw & Pedersen, 2009). 
 
Similarly the promise of Institutional theory, (Rosenzweig and Singh (1991) and Westney 
(1994, 1990), argues that firms will deliberately adopt practices and behaviours similar to 
others in their task environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
Westney argues that subsidiary units face competing isomorphic pulls from the host country 
and from the rest of the MNE. by comparing the practices of an individual unit to those in the 
host country and the MNE, implications could be drawn about the MNE’s strategy. This line 
of thinking was applied to a number of empirical studies (Rosenweig & Nohria, 1995, 
Westney, 1990), but the interest in institutional theory has dropped of in recent years baring 
some exceptions (e.g. Kostova & Roth, 2002). 
  
A number of other theoretical perspectives also occasionally feature in subsidiary 
management research. For example, Birkinshaw (1999) portrays the MNE as an internal 
network system in which subsidiary units compete with one another for charters, but it is not 
yet clear if this approach will yield any valuable insights. In addition, several concepts have 
been adapted from the social psychology literature, including procedural justice (Kim & 
Mauborgne, 1991) and feedback seeking behaviour (Gupta, Govindarajan, & Malhotra, 
1999), to model the HQ subsidiary relationship. Agency theory has also been used in this way 
(Chang, 1999, Kim, Prescott, & Kim, 2005) but its usefulness for studying headquarters and 
subsidiary relationships has been questioned (Watson O'Donnell, 2000). 
 
Interestingly, the theory which is arguably the dominant conceptual paradigm in strategic 
management has received relatively little attention in the MNE literature. The resource based 
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view of the firm has the potential to contribute greatly to the study of the MNE, but with few 
notable exceptions (e.g. Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998, Rugman & Verbeke, 2001) it has been 
largely ignored. The key premise of the Resource Based View is that under certain conditions 
a firm’s unique bundle of resources and capabilities can generate competitive advantage 
(Barney, 1991) More recent literature also focuses on the development of dynamic 
capabilities and knowledge as drivers of competitive advantage (Grant, 1996, Teece, Pisano, 
& Shuen, 1997). So why has a theory that offers so much potential been underused in the 
study of the MNE? We argue that the level of analysis constitutes the primary concern. The 
resource based view implicitly assumes that resources and capabilities are developed in one 
large firm, whereas the reality in the MNE is that resources are dispersed around the firm, at 
the parent and subsidiary levels. 
 
In our search for a new conceptual framework to address these concerns, we need to more 
deeply examine the strategy processes which underlie resource deployment and capability 
development at the subsidiary level.  
 
Developing Strategy to Drive Subsidiary Development 
 
Considering the depth of subsidiary management research it is unusual that from a strategy 
perspective there are no clear insights to guide both researchers and subsidiary managers 
(Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2009, Scott, Gibbons, & Coughlan, 2010). One of the factors 
behind this has been the confusion over what constitutes subsidiary strategy and what are its 
main components? A distinction is commonly made in the literature between the concepts of 
subsidiary strategy and subsidiary role. A subsidiary’s role is assigned to it by the parent 
company, whereas subsidiary strategy suggests some level of choice or self determination on 
the part of the subsidiary (Birkinshaw & Pedersen, 2009). The underlying premise of 
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subsidiary strategy is that despite the constraints placed on subsidiary management by 
headquarters and the marketplace, they still make decisions of their own volition, not simply 
on behalf of HQ. 
 
We argue that it is inappropriate to include competitive advantage as the objective of 
subsidiary strategy development, as the subsidiary is only one part of the corporation and 
competitive advantage is commonly argued to arise as a result of the unique configuration and 
coordination of a corporation’s activities (Porter, 1996). The important elements of subsidiary 
strategy as identified by Birkinshaw and Pedersen (2009), are the market positioning 
component and the resource development component. Strategy is about how these two 
components are brought together taking into account that subsidiaries’ customers and 
competitors are very often with the MNE network in a model of co-opetition (Luo, 2005). To 
study strategy development at the subsidiary level it is important to analyse how well 
subsidiary managers identify with the two components of strategy and secondly how many of 
the components of subsidiary strategy are actually under the control of the subsidiary 
manager?  
 
Subsidiary strategy development must recognise the range of constraints on its behaviour and 
in its ability to develop strategy. The dual embeddedness constraint relates to their operation 
within two parallel webs of differentiated networks, the internal web  that includes all the 
other units of their parent MNE, and the sometimes overlapping, but often separate complex 
external local network of customers, suppliers and other institutions (Nohria & Ghoshal, 
1994). The domain constraint comprises the typically  pre set business domain limiting their 
market positioning options(Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). The resource constraint refers to their 
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inability to act independently in acquiring or utilising resources, and their need to maintain 
lateral relations with other units of the MNE (Birkinshaw & Morrison, 1995).  
 
Market Positioning 
There are significant trends underway which look set to further limit the freedom at which 
subsidiaries shape their market position. The emergence of global customers for products has 
meant that subsidiaries are no longer required to develop products for the specific needs of a 
particular market (Mudambi, 2008). Outsourcing and offshoring of activities has also led to 
subsidiaries playing smaller roles within global supply chains (Buckley, 2009). Mudambi 
(2008) describes how corporate headquarters may decide on the particular location for value 
creation within their value chain, consigning the remaining subsidiary units to fulfil their 
specific role with little additional input. Increased access to information has also reduced 
knowledge deficit in MNEs, giving headquarters unprecedented access to the activities of 
their subsidiaries, reducing the potential autonomy of the subsidiary (Yamin & Sinkovics, 
2007). In fact most subsidiaries actually have far less control over their market positioning 
that the traditional approach would suggest. 
 
Resource Development 
Resources are defined as the stock of available factors owned or controlled by the firm, and 
capabilities are a firm’s capacity to deploy resources, usually in combination, using 
organisational processes to effect desired end (Amit & Shoemaker, 1993). If a subsidiary is to 
be taken as a unit of analysis in its own right is it possible to split up resources and 
capabilities between the subsidiary and the MNE? Taking resources first, Birkinshaw and 
Pedersen (2009) argue that most tangible resources are held at the subsidiary level, while 
most intangible resources are held at the firm level. There are obvious exceptions to this 
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analysis but the crucial point is that it is possible to identify a difference in resources. To 
make such a split with capabilities is a much more difficult task. Some capabilities are 
definitely held at the firm level and are distributed across the network of subsidiaries. Others 
emerge at the subsidiary level for example and are particular to individual subsidiaries. The 
majority, however, are located somewhere between the firm level and the subsidiary level 
making them very difficult to separate.  
 
This highlights the difficulties in studying strategy development at the subsidiary 
management level and we develop  a new approach to address these shortcomings. Rather 
than applying a single theory to the study of subsidiary strategy it is proposed in this article 
that due to the difficulties associated with taking the subsidiary as the unit of analysis 
combining elements of two theoretical approaches could offer the greatest avenue for the field 
to develop. 
 
A STRATEGIC THEORY OF THE SUBSIDIARY 
The difficulties in applying theory to the study of subsidiaries highlight the need for strategy 
researchers to develop a framework. In his review of the strategy field, Foss (1999) contends 
that strategy research has been heavily influenced by both economic theories of the firm and 
the resource-based view. Rumelt (1984 p.557) proposes that the obvious future for the study 
of business strategy is to ‘rest it on the bedrock foundations of the economist’s model of the 
firm’.  
 
Foss (1999 p.727) outlines that the ‘strategic theory of the firm’ should be focused on 
addressing the following four areas:  
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1. The existence of the firm – namely, why do firms exist as distinct mechanisms for 
resource allocation in a market economy? 
2. The boundaries of the firm – namely, what explains why certain transactions are 
governed in house while others are governed through market relations? 
3. Internal organisation – namely, why do we observe different types of (formal and 
informal) organisational structure, and accompanying phenomena, such as internal 
labour markets, job ladders, profit centres etc? 
4. Competitive advantage – namely, which factors amount for superior rent earning 
capability? Ultimately, this issue concerns why firms are heterogeneous. 
 
Foss used this comprehensive criterion to evaluate the economics of organisation and the 
resource based view. His findings confirmed that the economics of organisation was strong on 
issues .1, .2 & .3 and the resource based view was strongest on issue .4. The reason for this is 
more than likely based in the historical development of both theories. Whereas the economics 
of organisation began with issues .1, .2 and .3 (existence, boundaries and the internal 
organisation of the firm) and then moved to being applied to issue .4 (competitive advantage), 
the resource based view began with the analysis of issue .4 and has, in more recent times 
moved on the addressing the other issues. Is this paragraph necessary? 
 
When studying subsidiary strategy, competitive advantage (issue 4) is not the sole concern as 
the subsidiary is only one part of the corporation and competitive advantage is commonly 
argued to arise from the entire organisations activities. Issues such as the boundaries of the 
firm and the internal governance of the firm however, are crucial as they have a direct impact 
on the strategic options available to subsidiary management. 
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This highlights the less than straight forward task for subsidiary strategy research. Foss (1999) 
proposes two approaches available to researchers, ‘isolationism’ and ‘integrationism’. The 
first of these research strategies isolationism, which he argues is incomplete, implies that the 
strategic theory of the firm should be founded on either the Resource based view or the 
economics of organisation alone. The second research strategy, ‘integrationism’, implies that 
research on the strategic theory of the firm should be based on ideas from both the economics 
of organisation and the resource based view. Foss defends this approach, by arguing in 
particular that when there are interaction effects between governance and knowledge 
considerations, there is a strong argument in favour of integrationism, while isolationism is 
likely to produce a biased view. It is argued in this paper that the study of subsidiary 
management has so far followed an isolationist approach ignoring the constant interaction of 
governance and knowledge constraints placed on subsidiary managers, but why has this been 
the case? 
 
In response, we analysed the theory of the multinational enterprise (MNE), which has been 
predominantly developed in what Foss would describe as the ‘isolationist’ approach (1999). 
Mmodern transaction cost theory of the MNE (Buckley and Casson (1976), and Teece (1977), 
Rugman (1981), Williamson (1981), Hennart (1982). However, according to a number of 
prominent management scholars predominantly associated with a more Resource Based 
perspective (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989, Birkinshaw, 2000, Doz & Prahalad, 1991, Ghoshal & 
Moran, 1996, Hedlund, 1994), this type of international business literature is often viewed as 
largely peripheral to obtaining an in depth understanding of the actual functioning of complex 
organisations such as MNEs. For protagonists of a transaction cost perspective it is a baffling 
situation, where despite its foundation, the transaction cost approach to the analysis of the 
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functioning of the MNE, is regarded by some to have little to contribute to the understanding 
of the internal functioning of the MNE (Rugman & Verbeke, 2003). 
 
One of the problems for TCE is that it is always associated with a classic problem of 
international business research, the choice of an MNE to enter a market. Largely influenced 
by TCE, traditional studies treat particular entry as a “transaction”(Anderson & Gatignon, 
1986), and a key concern is whether to rely on external market measures (e.g. exporting) or to 
internalise operations (e.g. FDI) (Buckley & Casson, 1976). In contrast, the other 
predominant theory aises the level of analysis from the transaction to the firm, suggesting that 
a particular entry decision cannot be viewed in isolation, but in relation to the overall strategic 
posture of the firm (Hill, Hwang, & Kim, 1990), but has had little application beyone the 
management of the MNE and its network of subsidiaries.  
 
The RBV highlights the crucial strategic challenges facing managers within organisations, 
understanding the functionality of the resources under their control, and understanding those 
resources under the control of other firms. But Perteraf and Bergin (2003) note that managers 
may be poor at understanding the range of functions from their resource bases for a number of 
reasons, one of which being the problems with bounded rationality as defined by Williamson 
(1975). This bounded rationality problem is magnified in a modern Multinational corporation 
with a network of subsidiaries in dispersed locations. Corporate headquarters are faced with a 
decision of whether to insist on high levels of control over their subsidiaries in order to reduce 
risk (Chang, 1999) or to allow greater levels of  subsidiary autonomy as outlined by 
Burgleman (1983a) and developed further by Birkinshaw and Morrison (1995). Etemand and 
Dulude (1986) contend that it is the subsidiary’s relative autonomy that allows it to determine 
strategy and thus ultimately control over local returns and performances. To allow this 
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situation to develop there is a transaction cost challenge for top management, which calls for 
the introduction of transaction cost economising tools so that bounded rationality problems 
can be reduced at the subsidiary level (Rugman & Verbeke, 2003).  
 
However, recent evidence suggest that developments in ICT, and increased off shoring and 
outsourcing, are enabling corporate headquarters to reasserted much of their control over, 
their network of subsidiaries (Yamin & Sinkovics, 2007). Value is now being created in 
smaller pockets of the MNE, and the power of the subsidiary unit seems to be on the wane 
(Mudambi, 2008). This raises critical questions about the resource based theories of the role 
of the subsidiary and the potential for these units to influence the power structure of the MNE 
(Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2007, Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998, Birkinshaw, Hood, & 
Jonsson, 1998, Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008b). A change is now underway that suggests that 
the  most recent developments in the MNE, such as the emergence of the global factory 
(Buckley, 2009), are more closely aligned with the transaction cost / internalisation thinking 
of Buckley and Casson (1976). 
 
Rugman and Verbeke suggest that perhaps a complementary resource based and transaction 
cost perspective, is required to describe the actual processes of resource combinations into 
competences and capabilities within the MNE (Rugman & Verbeke, 2001, Rugman & 
Verbeke, 2003). Verbeke (2003) proposes that economising on internal transaction costs is the 
crucial management task facing management with MNEs. The internal firm specific problems 
of governing knowledge generation and exploitation, resulting from imperfect markets which 
are highlighted by TCE analysis, remain as valid and important to managers today, as they did 
when Buckley and Casson (1976) first highlighted them.  
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Towards an Integrating Framework 
It is proposed that an isolationist approach (Foss, 1999), applying one stand alone theory to 
the study of subsidiary strategy results in an incomplete picture. A complementary analysis 
employing both transaction cost and resource based considerations has the potential to greatly 
enhance this emerging field of research. This type of analysis has been previously employed 
by Rugman and Verbeke (2003, 1992) and has also been utilised by Madhok (2002) in the 
study of inter firm collaborations. While the relation between the RBV and TCE is both rival 
and complementary, it is really more of the later than the former (Williamson, 1999).  
 
The insights provided by applying this approach to subsidiary strategy development enable us 
to propose the following conceptual framework. We believe it represents the first tentative 
stepts towards a comprehensive subsidiary theoretical foundations, capturing the nuances of 
the complex position of the subsidiary unit of analysis.  
Diagram to be included and discussed. 
 
 From a resource based perspective subsidiary strategy is based on developing the resources 
and capabilities which are under the control of subsidiary management. However, as 
Birkinshaw and Pedersen (2009) acknowledge the goal of this strategy is not to achieve a 
competitive advantage in the traditional resource based approach. Instead the focus of 
subsidiary strategy is to develop resources and capabilities which are highly valued, and as a 
result are internalised within the MNE ensuring the subsidiaries survival and future 
development. This approach to subsidiary strategy is more in line with the Transaction Cost / 
Internalisation thinking of Buckley and Casson (1976) and Rugman and Verbeke (2001, 2003, 
1992). To truly unravel all the full picture of subsidiary strategy a theoretical basis combining 
20 
 
resource based and transaction cost considerations has the potential to increase the relevance 
and validity of research to both theory and practice. 
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